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GOVERNMENT REGULATION
IN THE PRIVATE INTEREST
DR. K. G. JAN PILLAI*
In this article Dr. K. G. Jan Pillai argues that the Civil Aero-
nautics Board is a tool of the airline industry, that it has been in-
different to consumer needs, and that it has not strictly enforced
all provisions of the Federal Aviation Act. Dr. Pillai, one of the
nation's foremost consumer advocates, focuses special attention on
CAB regulation of transatlantic fares. He concludes that the Board
should eventually be phased out of the transportation system en-
tirely.
I. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
HE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT,1 which created the Civil
Aeronautics Board and sustains the CAB-franchised airlines,
was drafted at a secret meeting of air carrier representatives
held in a Washington hotel in late January and February of
1937.' The Act requires the CAB, inter alia, to promote, develop,
and encourage an air transportation system suitable to the needs of
commerce, defense, and postal services, "to improve the relations
between... air carriers," and to prevent "unfair or destructive
competitive practices." The CAB was given authority by the Act
to certificate air carriers, to make rates, to approve mergers, and
to award subsidies. Air carriers and their ticket agents were given
* Dr. Pillai, an Associate Professor at Temple University School of Law, is
the Executive Director of the Aviation Consumer Action Project. He is a graduate
of Kerala University, India, B.A., LL.M., and Yale University, J.S.D.
I Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C. 5
1301-1542 (1970). The Civil Aeronautics Act, originally enacted in 1938, was re-
adopted with minor modifications as the Federal Aviation Act.
2 J. GOULDEN, THE SUPER LAWYERS 33-34 (1972); Senate Subcomm. of the
Committee on Interstate Commerce, Regulation of Passengers and Property by
Aircraft, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., at 515; C. KELLY, JR., THE SKY'S THE LIMIT:
THE HISTORY OF THE AIRLINES (1963).
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the exclusive right to complain against unfair or deceptive prac-
tices.! The Act declares that in determining rates and fares the CAB
should consider not only the public need for "adequate and efficient
transportation [by air] ... at the lowest cost consistent with the fur-
nishing of such service," but also "the need of each air carrier for
revenue sufficient... [to provide the necessary service] under hon-
est, economical, and efficient management. . . ."' In short, the Fed-
eral Aviation Act represents the maximum protection and benefits
that any major industry can elicit from the federal government.
Apparently keeping faith with its original legislative mandate,
the CAB has always shown self-sacrificing devotion to the interests
of the airlines, often at the expense of the traveling public's wel-
fare. In 1969 the CAB for the first time made a survey of consumer
complaints received by airlines; it found that the baggage and per-
sonal belongings of more than 200,000 passengers were lost or
damaged in the previous year.' The CAB initiated a rule-making
proceeding in order to establish a system of "uniform reporting of
consumer complaint statistics,"' but after two years of deliberation
the Board terminated the proceeding on the ground that the report-
ing requirement would be unduly burdensome for the Board and
carriers, and that it might even "discourage the receipt of consumer
complaints" by the carriers.'
Flight delays and cancellations are the number one subject of
consumer complaints. Recently a congressional study revealed that
the airlines operate 75% of their flights late, disregarding their
published schedules.! In 1957 the CAB promulgated rules requiring
carriers to establish "realistic schedules" and to perform at least
75% of their flights within schedules filed with the Board or pub-
lished for the guidance of the public.' At the behest of the airlines,
however, the CAB defined a "scheduled time flight" as a scheduled
flight "completed within the block-to-block time allowed in the
schedule, plus 15 minutes." Block-to-block time is nothing but the
349 U.S.C. § 1381 (1970); 49 U.S.C. § 1482(e)(2) (1970).
449 U.S.C. § 1482(e)(5) (1970).
5 CAB, CONSUMER COMPLAINT SURVEY (1969).
- EDR-202, SPDR-23, - Fed. Reg. - (May 27, 1971).
7 EDR-2-2B, SPDR-23B, - Fed. Reg. - (April 2, 1973).
'Anderson, The Evening Bulletin (Phila.), Jan. 12, 1974, at 20.
14 C.F.R. 5 250.10 (1971).
GOVERNMENT REGULATION
period that begins when the aircraft starts moving at the destination
point. In fact there is no need for the CAB regulation because the
airlines seldom fail to operate within block-to-block time except
when they face unavoidable mechanical failures or congestion in
the runway--eventualities that no passenger would complain about
if he could verify the cause of delay." The CAB regulation, how-
ever, is deceptive because it excludes those flight delays commonly
experienced by passengers at airline terminals, and it tries to pro-
tect the airlines from possible legal liability for not operating flights
within schedules shown in passenger tickets. In 1972 the Aviation
Consumer Action Project petitioned the CAB to change the "flight
delays" regulation and to impose penalties for failure to operate
flights within scheduled times." The CAB dismissed the petition
on the ground that any regulation that requires scheduled airlines




For years the airlines have engaged in the deceptive practice of
systematically and intentionally over-booking flights by accepting
more "confirmed reservations" and selling more tickets than the
number of seats that are actually available on their aircraft. De-
spite repeated complaints from passengers, the CAB has not even
attempted to prevent airline over-booking; instead, the CAB adopt-
ed a regulation requiring airlines to tender compensation to pas-
sengers who are denied boarding on the flight for which they hold
confirmed reservations." By this regulation the CAB, in effect, en-
dorsed the practice of over-booking, and as a result the domestic
scheduled airlines deny boarding to approximately 250,000 pas-
sengers every year on flights for which they have confirmed reser-
vations.'
10 It is the practice of all airlines to justify cancellations and delays of flights
on the ground by "mechanical and operational reasons," even when such cancella-
tions and delays are caused by deceptive scheduling practices or negligence of
personnel. Therefore, the airlines should be required to report to the CAB the
cause of delay or cancellations as and when it occurs.
" In a companion complaint ACAP alleged that in 1971 and 1972 the domes-
tic airlines failed to perform about 60% of their flights according to published
schedules. See CAB Docket Nos. 24204, 24363.
1" It should be noted that the petition specifically stated that the airlines should
be exempted from the proposed penalty provision when the delay was occasioned
by safety reasons. See CAB Order No. 73-6-28 (June 8, 1973).
14 C.F.R. § 250 (1967).
' In Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, 365 F. Supp. 128 (D.D.C. 1973). Alle-
19741
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In 1972 Allegheny Airlines failed to accommodate Ralph Nader
on a flight from Washington, D. C. to Hartford, Connecticut, for
which he had a confirmed reservation. This resulted in the disrup-
tion of Mr. Nader's prearranged personal schedule, including a
speech at a citizens' rally in Hartford. Mr. Nader and the organ-
izers of citizens' rally sued Allegheny in federal district court; they
were awarded $61.00 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in
punitive damages. 5 The court found that the airline had "intention-
ally engaged in substantial over-selling, and intentionally did not
inform the public of this practice and the attendant risks, and in-
tentionally sought to conceal such information from all its passen-
gers ... [and] acted not only wantonly but with malice."'6 Within
a few weeks after the decision the CAB issued a proposed rule 7
that contemplates the imposition of advance ticket purchase re-
quirements on passengers who make reservations, levies substantial
penalties for non-cancellation of reserved tickets which the passen-
gers fail to use, and increases the amount of compensation cur-
rently stipulated for denied boarding.'8
In 1973, without soliciting carriers' economic justifications or
public comments, the CAB approved an intercarrier agreement
which provided for a 5% increase in the transpacific air fares. 9
The approval was for a limited period of thirty days, April 1
through April 30, 1973, and by its own terms the agreement ex-
pired on April 30, 1973. The carriers later filed another agreement
seeking the continuation of the 5% increase through March 31,
1974." The CAB did not immediately rule on the new agreement
gheny's records showed that during the period from January 1969 through August
1972, the carrier bumped 15,929 persons or about 6,000 persons a year. Allegheny
carried only 2.5% of domestic passengers in the twelve months ended September
30, 1973. On the basis of this percentage, it is calculated that the domestic trunks
and local service carriers annually bump about 250,000 passengers.
15 Id.
1d. at 127.
'r CAB Order No. 73-12-93 (Dec. 21, 1973).
'8 The proposed penalty for non-cancellation of an unused reserved ticket is
$25 minimum and $100 maximum. The proposed compensation for denied board-
ing is $500 maximum, rather than the existing $200.
11 CAB Order No. 73-3-137 (March 30, 1973). The approval order stated
that "the new fares established pursuant to the agreement would be effective
through April 30, 1973."
2' Along with this agreement the carriers filed another agreement seeking an
additional 4% fare increase. CAB Order No. 73-7-54 (July 12, 1973).
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but invited interested persons to submit comments, ordered the car-
riers to submit economic justifications to support the requested fare
increase, and expressly directed that "tariffs implementing the sub-
ject agreement shall not be filed in advance of Board approval of
the subject agreements."'" After receiving comments and justifica-
tions, the CAB disapproved the fare agreement on July 12, 1973,
on the ground that the fare increase was not economically justi-
fied.' The carriers refused to roll back the fares after the expiration
of the first agreement; instead, they continued to implement the
5% fare increase from May 1 through July 12, 1973, without CAB
approval. The CAB did not even consider ordering the airlines to
refund the illegal overcharges, and the aggrieved passengers were
denied judicial remedy on the ground that, under the Federal Avia-
tion Act, only the CAB is empowered to investigate unfair and
deceptive practices of airlines.2
II. THE BOARD: CHAMPION OF INDUSTRY
The foregoing is a random sample from an infinitely long list of
consumer related actions of the CAB. The CAB's interest in the
traveling public is essentially remote and indirect-an interest de-
rived from their status of being the inexhaustible source of airline
revenues and a catalyst of infrequent congressional irritation. Nev-
ertheless, during the first three decades of its regulation the CAB
took meticulous care to spice its decisions with references to con-
sumer interests, a ritual incantation deemed necessary to maintain
its image as the guardian of public interest. But in recent years,
the CAB has been endowed with a so-called Republican majority
which repudiates the Board's past duplicity and adheres to the
"strict construction" of the Federal Aviation Act. A few months
ago, The Wall Street Journal outlined the Chairman's simple regu-
latory philosophy:
Mr. Timm has emphasized that 'every tool in our arsenal' should
be used to help the industry. And the airlines know best what help
2 CAB Order No. 73-4-60, at 3 (April 12, 1973).
CAB Order No. 73-7-54 (July 12, 1973).
23 Clarence Ditlow, an attorney from Washington, D.C., sued the airlines after
being charged the 5% excess fares for his trip between the West Coast and Tokyo
made between May 15 and May 20, 1973. The district court granted the airline's
motion for summary judgment. The decision has been appealed. Clarence Ditlow
v. Pan American Airways, No. 73-2936, - F. Supp. - (D.D.C. 1973).
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is necessary, he adds. 'We are going to have to run to catch up
with the people we serve."
At a recent hearing before the House Committee on Appropria-
tions the same Chairman praised the "Congress' wisdom in framing
legislation that insures a privately owned, free-enterprise airlines
system that, to a large extent, is self-regulating," and reiterated the
"Board's number one priority," to strengthen the system by taking
bold and controversial actions which, in his opinion, means: "We
are going to have to run to catch up with the people that we
serve." The members of the Committee certainly applauded his
concept of regulation.
Now that the delirium about the inveterate regulatory trait of the
CAB seems to be over, an impartial evaluation of its role in devel-
oping an efficient air transportation system is called for. Even ac-
cording to the CAB, the airline industry is financially sick, beset
by substandard earnings and by lack of "investor confidence. '
The de facto ownership and management of airlines have been
taken over by a handful of banks and insurance companies through
carefully contrived techniques of control such as stock ownership,
interlocking directorships, lease transactions, and long term debts."
The Chase Manhattan Bank exercises multiple control over sixteen
CAB-certificated carriers.' The very survival of these airlines, let
alone the job security of airlines' top executives, is dependent on
the continuing good will of the illegal owners. Eight local service
carriers will be given $65.5 million in fiscal year 1974 as direct
federal subsidies," and all other twenty-six certificated carriers will
receive indirect subsidies in the form of remuneration for mail car-
riage and performance of military and naval contracts. Pan Ameri-
can World Airways, the largest U. S. international airline, has ad-
Karr, Timm for a Change, The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 7, 1973, at 36.
' Statement of Chairman Robert D. Timm Before the Subcomm. for Depart-
ment of Transportation and Related Agencies of the House Comm. on Appro-
priations, April 17, 1973.
"Keeping Profits Low, Fares High: The CAB-pilots the Planes, N. Y. TIMES
MAGAZINE, August 12, 1973, at 9.
27 For detailed description of the extent and methods of control, see Aviation
Consumer Action Project v. Cede & Co., CAB Docket No. 24524, and ACAP v.
First National City Bank, CAB Docket No. 24593.
2"Pillai, The Friendly Skies of Chase Manhattan, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan.
27, 1973.
2CAB Order No. 73-10-1 (Oct. 1, 1973).
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vised its stockholders that the airline will become insolvent unless
the federal government soon bails the carrier out with a substantial
direct subsidy.' There are other airlines waiting on the line to fol-
low the tailspin course of Pan American."
Since 1969, the air fares have been increasing at a spiraling rate.
For instance, between 1969 and 1973 the Washington-New York
air shuttle fare has gone up from $17.14 to $26, an increase of
roughly 52%, and the Washington-Cleveland coach fare was in-
creased 52% from $23 to $35.' According to most reliable statis-
tics, the direct operating costs (about 50% of the total costs) of
a Boeing 747 are about one cent per seat-mile or a total seat-mile
cost of $50 from New York to Los Angeles." The CAB, however,
permitted the airlines to increase the coach fare for New York-Los
Angeles from $145 to $176 or by 21.3% during the 1969 through
1973 period." Since the quasi-public National Railroad Passenger
Corporation (Amtrak) took over responsibility for much of the
nation's passenger rail traffic in 1971, the use of Amtrak trains in-
creased by 12% in each of its first two years and by about
25% during the last months of 1973. This upturn came after a
steady twenty-year drop that paralleled the decline of train serv-
ices.' This booming railroad passenger traffic has a direct relation
to the ever-increasing cost of air travel. In 1970 domestic trunk
airline traffic increased only 0.3% over the previous year, and dur-
ing the three years ending 1972 it grew at a discouraging annual
rate of 4.2% in terms of revenue passenger miles.' The estimated
increase in domestic trunk traffic in 1973 is just around 7%, com-
pared with the annual growth rate of 18% in the sixties."
The CAB's frantic actions that boosted the air fares began in
1969 when the airlines' net income dwindled to $52 million, com-
"Washington Post, Dec. 5, 1973, at D14.
"1 American Airlines and Eastern Airlines are two carriers in deeper financial
trouble.
"CAB tariff files.
3 Quoted from AVIATION WEEK in Keeping Profits Low, Fares High, NEW
YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, August 12, 1973, at 39.
"CAB tariff files.
"N. Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1973, at E-10.
" CAB, AIR CARRIER TRAFFIC STATISTICS, XVI-12 (1970), XVII-12 (1971),
XVIII-12 (1972).
"1 HANDBOOK OF AIRLINE STATISTICS (1971 ed.).
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pared with $210 million in 1968 and $415 million in 1967." After
a secret meeting with airline executives, the CAB granted a 6%
increase in domestic fares in 1969. " Upon reversal by the U. S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia on procedural
grounds, ' the CAB remedied the alleged procedural irregularities
and permitted the carriers to refile the same fare increases that took
effect on October 15, 1970."' Before doing so the Board ordered
a general domestic passenger fare investigation ' in order to insulate
its future approvals of fare increases from judicial intervention. In
the investigation, the Board collected expense, income, and invest-
ment statistics from all carriers, put them under various bureau-
cratic accounting molds, and produced enormous computer print-
outs. The Board, however, never made any comparative study of
the differing degrees of efficiency and productivity of individual
carriers, nor did it examine the reasonableness of the airlines' ex-
penses. In the process the Board determined that the industry as
a whole is entitled to a "reasonable rate of return" of 12.0% to
11.35%,"' that the reasonable load factor standard should be
55%," and that the discount fares should be abolished unless they
meet certain standards stipulated by the Board.'
While the domestic passenger fare investigation was in progress,
the CAB-certificated route air carriers registered a net loss of
$200.5 million in 1970. Four domestic trunk carriers (Continen-
tal, Delta, Northwest and Pan American) and two local service
carriers (Allegheny and North Central), however, still made profits
in 1970.6 The CAB expedited the passenger fare investigation and
handed down its historic decision on April 9, 1971, declaring that
the then existing level of fares for domestic passenger services was
"unjust and unreasonable, and therefore unlawful."" The Board
granted "fare relief" in order to permit the carriers to increase their
88 Id.
"CAB Order No. 69-9-68 (Sept. 12, 1969).
"Moss v. CAB, 430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
4' CAB Order No. 70-7-128 (July 28, 1970).
CAB Order No. 71-1-147 (Jan. 29, 1970).
"CAB Order No. 71-4-58 (April 9, 1971).
"CAB Order No. 71-4-54 (April 9, 1971).
CAB Order Nos. 71-4-59, 71-4-60 (April 9, 1971).
CAB, AIR CARRIER FINANCIAL STATISTICS (Dec. 1970).
47CAB Order Nos. 71-4-59, 71-4-60 (April 9, 1971).
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yield by 12% over the fare levels that existed on October 15, 1970,
and such increased fares were simply declared "the lawful maxi-
mum fares.""' In 1971 the industry showed a profit of $31.4 mil-
lion, but the net income of Delta and Northwest dropped consider-
ably from their 1970 levels,"' and Allegheny which made a nominal
net profit of $.528 million in 1970 sustained a loss of $1.2 million
in 1971."
In granting the massive, unprecedented fare increase, the CAB
made a number of assumptions and predictions-all leading to the
conclusion that the industry would be strong and healthy in 1972.
The Board and the carriers agreed that the domestic trunk traffic
would have increased more than 26% from 1970 to 1972 at the
October 15, 1970, fare level. " Based on a 0.7 elasticity," how-
ever, the Board concluded that the 12% fare increase would have
no appreciable impact on the movement of traffic and that with
such an increase the trunk traffic would still grow 16.4% in 1972
from the 1970 level. " The actual traffic increased only 12.7% or
twelve billion revenue passenger miles from 1970 to 1972," more
than 3.7% short of the growth predicted by the Board.
The Board unanimously adopted a long-term trunkline load fac-
tor standard of 55% to be attained from April 1973." In 1971 the
trunk carriers operated with an average load factor of 48.3%. In
order to help carriers attain the CAB-stipulated load factor stan-
dard, the Board encouraged airlines to enter into joint capacity-
cutting agreements. In August 1971, the CAB approved a year-
long agreement among American, TWA, and United that reduced
the number of weekly, non-stop flights by an average of 28% in
four major transcontinental routes, New York-Los Angeles, New
York-San Francisco, Washington-Los Angeles, and Chicago-San
Francisco." Pursuant to that agreement the number of weekly, non-
48 CAB Order No. 71-4-59 at 85.
19 CAB, AIR CARRIER FINANCIAL STATISTICS (Dec. 1971).
50 Id.
"CAB Order No. 71-4-59, at 16-22 (April 9, 1971).
-1 The elasticity of demand of .7 means that a 1% increase in fares will result
in a 0.7% decrease in traffic.
51 CAB Order No. 71-4-59, at 16-22 (April 9, 1971).
14 CAB, AIR CARRIER TRAFFIC STATISTICS, XVII-12 (1971), XVIII-12 (1972).
15 CAB Order No. 71-4-54 (April 9, 1971).
5 CAB Order No. 71-8-91 (Aug. 1971).
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stop round-trips between New York and Los Angeles, for instance,
was cut from 185 to 132. In one year the carriers reduced about
6.4 billion seat miles and 7,250 flights in the four markets."7 When
it approved the agreement with "extreme reluctance," the Board
stated that "in view of the Federal Aviation Act's insistence on a
competitive air carrier system, and because over the long run that
system will operate most efficiently if carriers are required to make
capacity decisions unilaterally" no capacity cutting agreement will
be approved in the future. 8 Nevertheless, the Board not only re-
peatedly permitted the carriers to agree on renewed flight cutting
in the transcontinental market," but also approved similar agree-
ments among American, Eastern, and Pan American in the New
York-San Juan market."
Because of the transcontinental capacity limitation agreement,
the three carriers showed a cost saving of $78.5 million in 1972.61
In response to a request of the Department of Transportation to
reduce the fares in the agreement markets, the CAB stated that
"lower fares in the agreement markets might have ripple effects
throughout the air transportation system, perhaps unduly affecting
non-agreement carriers."" During the seven months from Novem-
ber 1972 through May 1973, TWA, American, and United oper-
ated 1132 flights in the agreement markets with a 95% or more
load factor." The CAB, however, was not convinced that operating
few flights with all seats filled will result in inadequate service for
travelers because the Board had not received a significant number
of complaints from passengers."' Despite the artificially elevated
load factor levels in the agreement markets, the average trunk load
factor remained far below the 55% aspired to by the Board in the
domestic passenger fare investigation. During the twelve months
ending October 31, 1973, the average domestic trunk load factor
"
7 CAB Order No. 72-11-6, at 10 (Nov. 2, 1972) (concurring opinion of
Member Timm).
"CAB Order Nos. 71-8-91 (Aug. 1971); 72-11-6, at 2 (Nov. 2, 1972).
"CAB Order Nos. 72-11-6 (Nov. 2, 1972); 73-7-147 (July 27, 1973).
60CAB Order Nos. 72-6-70 (June 16, 1972); 72-11-7 (Nov. 2, 1972); 73-8-59
(Aug. 10, 1973).
61 CAB Order No. 73-7-147 App. C (July 27, 1973).
"Id. at 10.
6I Id. at App. H.
Id. at 9, App. G.
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in fact declined to 51.2% from 51.9% for the comparable period
in 1972."
The CAB in 1971 estimated that the 12% fare increase would
produce for the trunk airlines an average 11.8% rate of return on
investment in 1972, assuming that the carriers operated at a mini-
mum load factor of 52.5%. In order to arrive at the average figure
of 11.8%, the Board even conceded to five trunk carriers a rate
of return ranging from 13.3% to 22.1% ." The airlines' profitabil-
ity actually experienced in 1972 demonstrates that the CAB esti-
mate was just another device to justify the fare increase. During
the twelve months ending in September 1972, the trunk carriers,
after operating at a 51.8% load factor produced only an average
6.1% rate of return on investment."
Despite the dissipation of its perverted economic formulae, the
CAB has not deviated from the basic determination to "strengthen
the air transportation system" with further fare increases. In
December 1972 the CAB declared the then existing family and
youth discount fares unlawful." Nevertheless, the Board declined
to order those fares cancelled immediately because their removal
would "significantly burden the traveling public.""9 After five
months the CAB reversed its decision and directed the carriers to
cancel the discount fares without compensating adjustments in the
normal fares"° on the ground that "the future financial outlook at
current fare levels for the domestic trunkline industry is at best
uncertain."" The elimination of discount fares was an indirect fare
increase of approximately 5.5%2 Even after increasing the pas-
senger fares by almost 24% since 1970, the domestic trunk air-
lines produced a 5.2% average return on investment during the
twelve months ending in September 1973. "
" QUARTERLY AIRLINE INDUSTRY ECONOMIC REPORT (Sept. 1973).
"6CAB Order No. 71-4-59, at 76 (April 9, 1971).
67 QUARTERLY AIRLINE INDUSTRY ECONOMIC REPORT (Sept. 1973).
68CAB Order No. 72-12-18 (Dec. 5, 1972).
9 d. at 75-76.
r'CAB Order No. 73-5-2 (May 1, 1973).
Id. at 9.
" This is based on the Board's estimate that the discount fares cause a 5.5%
dilution in the yield of airlines. In fact, a calculation based on revenues shows
that the elimination of discount fares is worth more than a 6% across-the-board
fare increase.
"QUARTERLY AIRLINE INDUSTRY EcONOMIc REPORT (Sept. 1973).
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In September 1973 the domestic trunklines requested another
fare increase of 5% to 8%. They claimed that the traffic growth
rate had fallen below the anticipated level, that costs had risen at
a rapid rate, and that their rate of return on investment had fallen
"far short of the Board's standard." The CAB suspended the in-
creased fares and ordered an investigation of their reasonableness,
stating that the carriers had failed (i) to attain the load factor
standard of 55%, and (ii) to demonstrate the alleged cost in-
creases."4 Astonishingly, within weeks the carriers again requested
a 5% general increase in domestic passenger fares, and the CAB
simply approved that increase in November 1973." Of course no
cataclysmic events occurred in the airline industry that would justify
a fare increase in November that the CAB had declared unjustifi-
able in September. The CAB, however, made calculations to show
that the airlines' unit cost had increased by 4.7% in 1973 and that
the carriers needed "revenue improvement" to earn a rate of re-
turn over 12%.
The Board claimed that the carriers' cost of operation is known
to have increased during the past year, whereas facts available to
us do not establish with the same certainty that five per cent in-
crease in fares will have such an adverse effect upon traffic as to
minimize the revenue improvement which has been demonstrated
as necessary."6
It should be noted that the adverse effect of fare increases on
traffic is relevant to CAB rate-making only inasmuch as it reduces
airlines' revenues.
The Federal Aviation Act requires the CAB to consider three
major elements in domestic rate-making: (i) the effect of rates on
tile movement of traffic; (ii) availability of such service; and (iii)
sufficient revenues to provide the service under honest, economical,
and efficient management." The history of domestic "rate hiking"
from 1970 through 1973 amply demonstrates that the CAB con-
sistently failed to consider the first two elements. The CAB mis-
construed the third element by assuring sufficient revenues to all
carriers, irrespective of the honesty, economy, or efficiency of their
74CAB Order No. 73-9-108 (Sept. 28, 1973).
11 CAB Order No. 73-11-93 (Nov. 20, 1973).
76 Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
7749 U.S.C. § 1482 (1970).
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management. In the CAB's language, "the basic approach to de-
termination of the allowable fare increase is to match revenues and
expenses" of the entire industry. 8
The Board's 'wishy-washy' regulation has already inflicted severe
injury to the health of U.S. international airlines. In 1946 the CAB
permitted U.S. carriers to associate with a secret price-fixing cartel,
the International Air Transport Association (IATA). Ever since,
the Board's role has been limited to rubber-stamping IATA agree-
ments that periodically prescribe rates and conditions of service
for international airlines. 9 In 1950 the U.S.-flag airlines carried
65.7% of all transatlantic traffic." In succeeding years the U.S.-
flag carriers' participation has steadily declined while the European
carriers made rapid inroads into the transatlantic market. The
three U.S. carriers' share of transatlantic traffic was 54.5% in
1970 and less than 47% in 1973, although U.S. citizens comprised
over 67% of the total airline passengers flying between the United
States and Europe."1
During the last five years, Pan American World Airways sus-
tained huge financial losses. From 1969 to 1972, the carrier showed
a net loss of $161.5 million, and in the year ending in June 1973
its net loss was $25.2 million.' In their transpacific operations,
American and TWA suffered losses in the past two years, and
Northwest's profit was reduced by one-half.83 At the same time the
passengers were paying higher and higher air fares. The North
Atlantic normal economy and short-term excursion fares have been
raised by an average of 25% and 30% respectively since March
1971. For instance, the New York-London peak season, normal
round trip economy fare was hiked from $510 to $685, and the
short term excursion fare went up from $350 to $457.8" IATA
increased the transpacific fares three times and the Caribbean and
Latin American fares four times since 1971.
7 8CAB Order No. 73-11-93, at 2 (Nov. 20, 1973).
79See generally K. G. J. PILLAI, THE Am NET: CASE AGAINT THE WORLD
AVIATION CARTEL (1969).
80 CAB, HANDBOOK OF AIRLINE STATISTICS 572 (1971 ed.).
81 CAB Order No. 73-10-55, at 39 (Oct. 15, 1973).
82CAB, AIR CARRIER FINANCIAL STATISTICS (Dec. 1970, 1971, 1972, and
June 1973).
83 CAB, AIR CARRIER FINANCIAL STATISTICS (Dec. 1971, 1972).
"4OFFICIAL AIRLINE GUIDE (March 1971, Jan. 1974).
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Until recently, the CAB attributed its misregulation of interna-
tional fares to lack of statutory authority to suspend fares filed by
individual carriers. The power to disapprove intercarrier agree-
ments under Section 412' and to remove unjust discrimination
under Section 403(b) 8 was considered insufficient to deal with
international fares. The CAB explained the need for additional
power to Congress:
At the present time, the Board's alternatives are limited when
it is presented with a (I.A.T.A.) Conference agreement containing
rates which are objectionable. If the Board disapproves, it risks
creating an open rate situation in which it has no influence at all,
and the carriers may file individually the same rates to which the
Board objected, or even less desirable ones."'
In 1972 the Congress amended the Act to give the CAB au-
thority to suspend and investigate fares that are unjust, unreason-
able, or unjustly discriminatory.88 The Congress believed that the
new amendment would "arm the CAB with sufficient authority to
exercise broad influence on international rate making,"" and "to
resist the threats and dictates of foreign governments with respect
to international air fares"" in the event of an open rate situation.
The legislative grant of power, however, did not alter the historical
orientation of the CAB regulation. The Board's pro forma regula-
tion of transatlantic fares will illustrate the point.
III. TRANSATLANTIC FARES: A CASE STUDY
In the early 1960s the IATA airlines embarked on a policy
of offering predatory discount fares with the avowed purpose of
eliminating extraneous competition from non- IATA charter air-
lines. Within a few years, a multiplicity of discount fares set at
30% to 50% discounts from normal fares became imbedded in
the transatlantic fare structure. The scheduled passengers who
8549 U.S.C. § 1382(b) (1970). This section requires that "the Board shall by
order disapprove any (intercarrier) contract or agreement . . . that it finds ad-
verse to the public interest."
"649 U.S.C. § 1373(b) (1970).
"T Statement of Secor D. Browne before the Aviation Subcommittee of the
Senate Commerce Committee in April 1971.
8849 U.S.C. § 1482(j) (Supp. 1973).
88S. Rep. No. 92-593, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-21 (1972).
I'ld. at 7-9.
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traveled on normal fares on IATA transatlantic airlines were re-
duced from about 67% to 30% of the total traffic during the ten
years from 1963 through 1973.1 In 1972, 70.4% of Pan Ameri-
can's transatlantic traffic used discount fares, as compared to
56.8% in 1970.2 Because of the complex and restrictive condi-
tions associated with their use, the discount fares failed to generate
sufficient new traffic to offset the erosion of carrier's average
revenue yields that resulted from diversion of passengers from the
normal fare to the discount fare category. As a result, the IATA
carriers repeatedly increased the normal fares to recoup losses
sustained from discount fares. The CAB belatedly realized that
the only cure for the financial ills of the U. S. carriers was an over-
haul of the transatlantic fare structure. In September 1971 the
CAB issued a "policy statement" providing:
The Board is convinced that the sound development of Civil air
transportation in the long term will be greatly enhanced by, and
indeed may well depend upon, the offering of fares and rates for
the various services which are closely attuned to the full economic
costs of providing those services. Conversely, we have substantial
doubts that a fare structure composed of multiple discounted fares,
applicable in periods of peak demand, and used by a majority of
travelers can hope to have that result. '
IATA filed its 1972 fare agreement that provided for the con-
tinuation of the existing fare structure and general fare increases;
the CAB approved the agreement, its policy statement notwith-
standing. The Board stated that "while the fare structure falls far
short of meeting [its] criteria ... it serves to resolve for the interim
highly controversial issues among carriers as to fare structure which
had threatened to create an open rate situation."' The Board's
approval was definitely based on the U. S. carriers' contention that
the IATA fare agreement was only a "stop-gap measure" of 1972,
aimed at avoiding an "open-rate situation. '' " Toward the end of
91 IATA Commercial Research Committee, ThE NORTH ATLANTIC STUDY
(June 1971).
92Pan American's Justification submitted to the CAB on Dec. 20, 1972, App.
D.
93 CAB POLICY STATEMENT ON INTERNATIONAL FAREs (Sept. 24, 1971).
94CAB Order No. 72-3-104, at 6 (March 30, 1972).
0 TWA's Justification submitted to the CAB, dated Jan. 13, 1972; Pan Amer-
ican's Justification, dated Dec. 20, 1972.
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1972, IATA airlines filed individual tariffs with the CAB, alleging
that their negotiations for 1973 fares had deadlocked on the issue
of still lower discount fares. The tariffs of foreign carriers were
remarkably more reasonable and simpler than the 1972 IATA
fares. The CAB, utilizing its newly acquired powers, suspended
the lower fares of eleven foreign carriers 6 and approved the rela-
tively higher fares of Pan American and TWA.9" Some of the
European governments reciprocated to the CAB's arbitrary action
by approving the fare proposals of their national carriers and re-
jecting those of the U. S. carriers. The individual tariff filings and
the governmental actions thereon, however, were just bargaining
techniques employed by the IATA airlines.9" The IATA airlines
eventually agreed on the 1973 transatlantic fares, and the U. S.
carriers withdrew their CAB-approved fares.
The new IATA agreement sought to rerun the 1972 trans-
atlantic fares through December 31, 1973, with an additional 6%
across-the-board increase attributed to the devaluation of the
U. S. dollar. The CAB was told that under the 1972 fare struc-
ture 65% of Pan American's and 77% of TWA's total trans-
atlantic passengers would travel on discount fares in 1973."' At
the same time the carriers predicted a decline in their load fac-
tors. None of the carriers, U. S. or foreign, submitted data showing
revenues earned and expenses incurred in U. S. dollars and foreign
currencies in order for the Board to evaluate the alleged effects of
devaluation.1"' The record indicated that the U. S. airlines would
make windfall profits from their sales abroad in revalued foreign
1 CAB Order Nos. 73-2-101-73-2-104 (Feb. 14, 1973); 73-3-63-73-3-69
(March 8, 1973).
11 CAB Order No. 73-1-76 (Jan. 26, 1973).
"s The U. S. airlines and the CAB were not serious about the approved fares.
The CAB, for instance, stated in its order that approved the Pan Am-TWA fare
package that it still expected IATA to come up with an agreement. The Board
also ordered the U. S. carriers not to advertise the approved fares.
81 Justification in support of Pan American North Atlantic Fare Structure
(Dec. 20, 1972); TWA Justification (Dec. 22, 1972).
M90 The criteria for justifying fare increases in the name of currency devaluation
were set forth by the CAB in its 1973 order that disapproved the transpacific
fares as follows: "Two sets of conditions may warrant an increase in fares re-
sulting from dollar devaluation. The first is U. S. carrier operations abroad which
earn less revenues in the foreign local currency than local expenses incurred in
local currency. . . . The second set of conditions . . . pertains to the revenue
expense relationship of the foreign-flag carriers in their business conducted in the
United States." CAB Order No. 73-7-54, at 7 (July 12, 1973).
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currencies. The Aviation Consumer Action Project (ACAP) filed
a complaint which protested the continuation of the status quo
fares and requested the CAB to disapprove the proposed 6% in-
crease and to order a general investigation of the transatlantic fare
structure."'
The CAB promptly approved the IATA agreement and the pro-
posed fare increase, without even giving the airlines an opportunity
to answer the ACAP complaint.' The Board stated that disap-
proval of the IATA fares and establishment of a fare structure
proposed by the U. S. carriers would create an open rate situation
leading to "intergovernmental confrontation [and] cessation of air
services," and causing "considerable inconvenience" to the travel-
ing public."3 The Board was convinced, however, that the main-
tenance of the status quo "will only serve to perpetuate the un-
economic situation which has developed on the North Atlantic"
and will not constitute "a rational and economic basis for pro-
vision of transatlantic service...... The Board called upon IATA to
"promptly and effectively resume its historically accepted role in
the area of international rates" with a view to produce a rational
fare structure for 1974.' The 6% increase did not "appear un-
reasonable" to the Board in light of the "acute consequences" of
the dollar devaluation for foreign carriers. The Board was "unable
to conclude that a formal and broad scale investigation of trans-
atlantic fares would serve a meaningful purpose at this time......
ACAP challenged the CAB order in the U. S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia in Pillai v. Civil Aeronautics Board.""
The court vacated the CAB order on the ground that it was vitiated
by abuse of discretion and its conclusions were not supported by
substantial evidence. The court said that the Board's imminent
vision of an open rate situation and the litany of horrors and bed-
0' Pillai, GoIwyn ACAP v. Pan American World Airways, CAB Docket 25396
(April 9, 1973).
1 2 Under Subpart-E of Part 302 of the CAB's Economic Regulations, 14
C.F.R. § 302.505 (1973), formal complaints against tariffs must be answered
within six days.
0' CAB Order No. 73-4-64, at 5 (April 13, 1973).
104 Id. at 3.
'0 Id. at 5.
106 Id.
.
07Pillai v. CAB, 485 F.2d 1018 (D.C.C. 1973) (decided Aug. 22, 1973).
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lam resulting therefrom would not absolve the Board of its responsi-
bility to make an informed assessment of the public interest, and
that the agency could not "wrap its decision in some mystique of
foreign policy or purported expertise in international negotiation
to achieve a non-reviewable status for the facts underlying its most
important and sensitive decisions..1. 8 The consequences of an open
rate situation were a mutual and reciprocal decision for the United
States and foreign governments who had enormous stakes in the
continuance of air traffic across the Atlantic, and there was no
evidence to suggest the possibility of a complete break-down of
such traffic. The court examined the legislative history of the 1972
amendment to the Federal Aviation Act that conferred on the CAB
the power to suspend international fares to show that the "legisla-
tion was specifically designed to lessen the terror of an open rate
situation and to strengthen the Board's hand in reviewing IATA
agreements....' The 1972 amendment contemplated bilateral ne-
gotiations between the U. S. Government and individual foreign
nations, and therefore the Board's apparent feeling that "almost
any [IATA] agreement was preferable on an open-rate situation""'
amounted to failure to make a reasoned choice of alternatives with-
in a class of permissible actions. Without reaching the issues of the
reasonableness of a 6% fare increase and the propriety of a gen-
eral investigation of the transatlantic fare structure the court re-
manded the case. Nevertheless, the court strongly condemned the
CAB's historical practice of rubber-stamping IATA agreements
as follows:
In weighing the duty of the CAB to consider alternatives other
than unanimity by IATA agreement, it should not be forgotten
that the whole IA TA concept as the most desirable and so far in-
evitable outcome of negotiations is definitely contrary to the phi-
losophy of antitrust laws, contrary to our usual view of the public
having the benefit of either competitive rates or rates set by a regu-
latory body in the public interest."'
On October 15, 1973, the CAB, after fulfilling the formality of
inviting additional comments from the airlines and other interested
101 Id. at 1023.
109 Id. at 1028.
110 Id.
"I Id. at 1029 (emphasis added).
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parties, reapproved the IATA agreement."2 This time the Board
wrote an eighty page order, compared with the original nine page
order vacated by the court. The CAB admitted that the agreement
was originally approved for the purpose of averting a "protracted
open rate situation" and not to "deprive United States airlines of
the additional, needed revenues which would be realized from the
6% currency adjustment."'' . Apart from elaborating the familiar
scenario of the impact of an open rate situation, the Board espoused
a theory advanced in the new Comments filed by the Department
of State that "it was by no means out of the question that some or
all Europeans might have been able to work out among themselves
an operating arrangement for North Atlantic services to a nearby
country such as Canada. . . ."" This theory is fallacious because
it unrealistically assumes that the so-called European coalition's
"operating arrangement" will work without the cooperation of U. S.
citizens who constitute 67% of the total transatlantic passengers;
that the European countries with their heavy dependence on the
U. S. tourist dollar would risk the odium of U. S. public opinion
and other economic ties with the U. S.; that the U. S. would be
destitute of a partner in Europe to make its own operating arrange-
ment; and that the neighboring countries like Canada would aban-
don the U. S. to make ad hoc alliance with more distant Europe.
The injudicious CAB's nightmare about the imaginary open rate
situation has now an added dimension: it is afraid that the future
international fares would depend on the good will of Canada, rather
than of the European countries as previously suspected.
The CAB's reapproval order was a virtual defiance of the pre-
scriptions of the U. S. Court of Appeals. Since the order came
just six weeks before the expiration of the IATA agreement there
was no room for further court proceedings. During the twelve
months ending October 31, 1973, Pan American's transatlantic
load factor dropped from 57.5% to 56.2%."' Pan American
continues its operating losses and TWA's profit continues to
decline."' IATA, however, failed to produce the "rational fare
"1
2 CAB Order No. 73-10-55 (Oct. 15, 1973).
"'3 id. at 28-29.
"14 Id. at 27.
"I CAB, EXPEDITED MODEL OF THE AIR CARRIER TRAFFIC STATISTICS REPORT
(Oct. 1973).
". CAB Order No. 73-11-132, App. 3 (Nov. 28, 1973).
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structure" promised by the CAB. The 1974 IATA transatlantic
agreement contained the same fare structure that was impugned
by the CAB from 1970 through 1973 and, of course, an addi-
tional fare increase of 2% to 12%. The CAB rejected the
increase proposed for normal economy fares and asked IATA to
consider eliminating the lowest excursion fare.' The old fare struc-
ture, including the lowest excursion fare, is in effect and alive. The
CAB has never investigated the transatlantic fares during the thirty-
eight years of its regulation, and as on previous occasions, the
agency "deferred action" on a request made in 1974 by ACAP for
an investigation."8 The CAB, the airlines, and the public are not
sure what a reasonable fare structure should be for transatlantic
travel; even if the CAB is sure, it remains a secret formula.
IV CONCLUSION
The CAB is an institutionalized restraint on the citizen's freedom
to travel at reasonable prices, and an unnecessary burden on the
nation's taxpayers. Its regulation is permeated by a penchant for
secrecy and unbridled bias for the industry. According to its chair-
man, the CAB's function is "listening" to the industry, rather than
"preaching" to it."9 But it does more. It legalizes all private indus-
try actions, in particular price-fixing and other non-competitive
agreements, and makes them litigation-proof. The rights of air
travelers are analogous to those enjoyed by the European customers
of oil producing nations of the Middle East; the travelers are sub-
ject to unilateral and spiraling price increases, spontaneous flight
cancellation, unexplained delays, flight cutbacks and bumping at
the whim of airlines.
One consoling fact is that the CAB, unlike other bureaucratic
herds in Washington, no longer pretends to uphold, and at times
even disclaims, any responsibility to protect the traveling public.
The CAB feels that the consumers are the indirect beneficiaries of
"I Id. at 13-14.
"'I d. at 14. ACAP requested an investigation of the transatlantic fare struc-
ture on four occasions: (a) Comments of ACAP, Feb. 25, 1972, in Docket
23486; (b) Complaint of Pillai in Docket 25054 (Jan. 2, 1973); (c) Complaint
of Pillai in Docket 25396 (April 9, 1973); and (d) Comments of ACAP in Dock-
et 25661 (Nov. 1973). Similar requests were made by the Department of Trans-
portation on several occasions.
"' See note 23 supra at 36, col. 1.
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the "economical and efficient air transportation system" which it
tries to protect and strengthen. The "system" strictly consists of
the chosen few airlines, and the efficiency and economy are those
available within the system.
The CAB Chairman recently told the Congress that "the airline
industry is no longer a growing child, but a mature adult" and that
"it should be afforded the same economic tools that other mature
industries have, including a healthy and non-destructive competi-
tive climate, responsible mergers, acquisitions, diversification, real-
istic pricing. . . ."" True. The only question is whether the airline
industry needs the CAB to acquire the "economic tools" if other
mature industries like steel, automobile, oil, and insurance can do
so without such an agency. After all, as one commentator stated in
the 1950's, the CAB's protective regulation is not indispensable
to the continued provision of air transport services any more than
it is necessary to secure an adequate supply of "soap, doorknobs
or automobiles.'
2 1
The concept of a competitive and flexible, nation-wide air trans-
portation system, free from stringent and debilitating government
control merits serious discussion and deliberation by the U. S. Con-
gress. The Landis Report on Regulatory Agencies recommended to
President Kennedy that the CAB be reorganized.I" The Ash Com-
mittee recommended to President Nixon that the CAB be abolish-
ed."' Complete and total economic deregulation of the airline
industry may be the ultimate and lasting solution to the "CAB-
problem." But to the airline industry that was conceived and
brought up under CAB patronage, abrupt deregulation would be
shocking and disastrous. Therefore the appropriate and pragmatic
solution is to phase out the CAB from the air transportation system.
As a first step, the Congress should deprive the CAB of its powers
over rates and fares, and intercarrier agreements. Of course, the
"I Statement of Chairman Timm before the Subcomm. for Department of
Transportation and Related Agencies of the House Comm. on Appropriations at
3 (April 17, 1973).
"I Keyes, A Reconsideration of Federal Control of Entry into Air Transpor-
tation, 22 J. AIR L. & CoM. 192, 196 (1955).
"I Landis, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT (Dec.
1960).
1"'ASH COMMITTEE REPORT (1969).
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CAB has a right to survival if it will "permit efficient airlines to
offer cheap fares and allow the inefficient ones to lose money.....
1"4 Passel and Ross, Keeping Profits Low, Fares High: The CAB Pilots the
Planes, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Aug. 12, 1973, at 9, 39.
